[Delivered at Centre Georges Pampidou, Traverses, 1998. Minor editing, headings, etc.]
Fetish Between Structure and Humanism
According to the classic Althusserian criticism, the Marxist problematic of commodity fetishism relies on the humanist ideological opposition of “human persons” versus “things.” Is it not one of Marx’s standard determinations of fetishism that it deals with “relations between things (commodities)” instead of direct “relations between people”? In other words, that in the fetishist universe, people (mis)perceive their social relations in the guise of relations between things? Althusserians are fully justified in emphasizing how, beneath this “ideological” problematic, there is another, entirely different-structural-concept of fetishism already at work in Marx. On this level, “fetishism” designates the short circuit between the formal/differential structure (which is by definition “absent”, i.e. it is never given “as such” in our experiential reality) and a positive element of this structure. When we are victims of the “fetishist” illusion, we (mis)perceive as the immediate/”natural” property of the object-fetish that which is conferred upon it because of its place within the structure. The fact that money enables us to buy things on the market, for example, is not a direct property of the object-money, but results from the place of money within the complex structure of socio-economic relations. Likewise, we do not relate to a certain person as a “king” because this person is “in himself” (on account of his charismatic character or something similar) a king, but because he occupies the place of a king within the set of socio-symbolic relations.
Our point, however, is that these two levels of the notion of fetishism are necessarily connected. They form the two constitutive sides of the very concept of fetishism, which is why one cannot simply devalue the first as ideological, in contrast to the second as properly theoretical (or “scientific”). To make this point clear, the first feature must be reformulated in a much more radical way. Beneath the apparently humanist-ideological opposition of “human beings” and “things”, there lurks another, much more productive notion, which is that of the mystery of substitution and/or displacement : how is it ontologically possible that the innermost “relations between people” can be displaced onto (or replaced by) “relations between things”? In other words, is it not a basic feature of the Marxian notion of commodity fetishism that “things believe instead of us, in place of us”? The point worth repeating again and again is that, in Marx’s notion of fetishism, the fetishist inversion lies not in what people think they are doing, but in their social activity itself. Thus, typical bourgeois subjects are, in terms of their conscious attitudes, utilitarian nominalists—it is in their social activity, in exchange on the market, that they act as if commodities were not simple objects, but objects endowed with special powers, full of “theological whimsies”. That is to say, people are quite aware of how things really stand; they know very well that the commodity-money is nothing but a reified form of the appearance of social relations, that, beneath the “relations between things,” there are “relations between people.” The paradox is that, in their social activity, they act as if they do not know this and follow the fetishist illusion. The fetishist belief, the fetishist inversion, is displaced onto things; it is embodied in what Marx calls “social relations between things.” And the crucial mistake to be avoided here is the properly “humanist” notion that this belief, embodied in things, displaced onto things, is nothing but a reified form of direct human belief.
The task of the phenomenological reconstitution of the genesis of “reification” is to demonstrate how original human belief was transposed onto things. The paradox to be maintained is that displacement is original and constitutive : there is no immediate, self-present living subjectivity to whom the belief embodied in “social things” can be attributed and who is then dispossessed of it. There are some beliefs, the most fundamental ones, which are from the very outset “decentered” beliefs of the Other; the phenomenon of the “subject supposed to believe” is thus universal and structurally necessary. From the very outset, the speaking subject displaces his or her belief onto the big Other qua the order of pure semblance, so that the subject never “really believed in it”; from the very beginning, the subject refers to some decentered other to whom he or she imputes this belief. All concrete versions of this “subject supposed to believe” (from small children for whose sake parents pretend to believe in Santa Claus to the “ordinary working people” for whose sake Communist intellectuals pretend to believe in Socialism) are stand-ins for the big Other.17 So what one should answer to the conservative platitude according to which every honest person has a profound need to believe in something is that every honest person has a profound need to find another subject who would believe in his or her place.
The Subject Supposed to Believe
In order to determine the scope of this notion of the subject supposed to believe as the fundamental, constitutive feature of the symbolic order,18 it may be compared to another, better-known notion: the subject supposed to know. When Lacan speaks of the subject supposed to know, it is usually overlooked that this notion is not the standard, but the exception, and that it gains its value in contrast to the subject supposed to believe as the standard feature of the symbolic order. What is the “subject supposed to know”? In the TV series Columbo, the crime (the act of murder) is shown in detail at the beginning, so that the enigma to be resolved is not “whodunit?”, but how the detective will establish the link between the deceitful surface appearance (the “manifest content” of the crime scene) and the truth about the crime (its “latent thought”), how he will prove the culprit’s guilt. The success of Columbo thus attests to the fact that the true source of interest in the detective’s work is the process of deciphering per se, not its result (the triumphant final revelation “And the murderer is…” is completely lacking here, since we know this from the very outset). Even more crucial is the fact that not only do we, the spectators, know in advance who did it (since we see it directly), but, inexplicably, the detective Columbo himself immediately knows: the moment he visits the scene of the crime and encounters the culprit, he is absolutely certain that the culprit did it.
- The actuality of the subject supposed to believe in Stalinist "totalitarianism" is perhaps best exemplified by the well-known incident concerning the Great Soviet Encyclopedia that occurred in 1954, immediately after the fall of Beria. When Soviet subscribers received the volume of the encyclopedia containing the entries under the letter B, there was, of course, a double-page article on Beria, praising him as the great hero of the Soviet Union. After his fall and denunciation as a traitor and spy, all subscribers received a letter from the publishing house asking them to cut out and return the page on Beria; in exchange they were promptly sent a double-page entry (with photos) on the Bering Strait, so that, when they inserted it into the volume, its wholeness was reestablished: there was no blank to bear witness to the sudden rewriting of history. The mystery here is: for whom was this (semblance of) wholeness maintained, if all subscribers knew about the manipulation (since they had to perform it themselves)? The only answer is, of course: for the non-existing subject supposed to believe.
- See Michel de Certeau, "What We Do When We Believe", in On Signs, ed. Marshall Blonsky (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 200. See also Chapter 5 of Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London, Verso, 1989).
- For that precise reason, Lacan speaks of the "knowledge in the real", not of the belief in the real. Another way to put this is to say that belief and knowledge relate to each other like desire and drive: desire is also always reflective, a "desire to desire", while drive is not "drive to drive".
- The logic of "subject supposed to know" is thus not "authoritarian" (relying on another subject who knows on my behalf) but, on the contrary, productive of new knowledge: the hysterical subject who incessantly probes the Master's knowledge is the very model of the emergence of new knowledge. It is the logic of "subject supposed to believe" that is effectively "conservative" in its reliance upon the structure of belief that must not be called into question by the subject ("whatever you think you know, retain your belief, act as if you believe.").
- A further interesting fact concerning the relationship between belief and knowledge is that attempts to "demonstrate the existence of God" (i.e., to confer the status of knowledge upon our assurance that "God exists") as a rule emerge when nobody seems to (i.e., to confer the status of knowledge upon our assurance that "God exists") doubt His existence (in short, when "everybody believes"), not in times when atheism is on the rise and religion is in crisis (who is today still seriously engaged in "proving the existence of God"?). One is thus tempted to claim that, paradoxically, the very endeavor to demonstrate the existence of God introduces doubt, in a way creating the problem it purports to solve. According to the standard Hegelian notion, attempts to prove God's existence through reasoning bear witness to the fact that the Cause (our immediate faith in Him) is already lost, i.e., that our relationship to Him is no longer a "substantial" faith but already a reflectively "mediated" knowledge. In clear contrast to this notion, reflective knowledge seems to have the status of an "excess" we indulge in when we are sure of our Faith (like people in an emotional relationship who can allow themselves to indulge in gentle mockery of their partners, precisely when they are so sure of the depth of their relationship that they know such superficial jokes cannot hurt it).
- I rely here, as well as in the remaining part of this text, on Robert Pfaller's contribution to Die Dinge lachen an unsere Stelle, conference held in Linz, Austria, 8-10 October 1996.
- It seems that today even pornography functions more and more in an interpassive way: X-rated movies are no longer primarily the means destined to excite the user in his (or her) solitary masturbatory activity. Just staring at the screen where "the action is" is sufficient—it is enough for me to observe how others enjoy in my place.
- Exemplary here is the case of Peter Handke, who for many years interpassively lived his authentic life, free from the corruption of Western consumerist capitalism, through the Slovenes (his mother was Slovene): for him, Slovenia was a country in which words related directly to objects (in stores, milk was called "milk" directly, avoiding the pitfall of commercialized brand-names, etc.)—in short, a pure fantasmatic formatic. Now, Slovene independence and willingness to join the European Union have unleashed a violent aggressivity in him: in his recent writings, he dismisses Slovenes as slaves of Austrian and German capital, selling their legacy to the West, and all this because his interpassive game was disturbed, because Slovenes no longer behave in the way that would enable him to be authentic through other Slovenes. No wonder, then, that he has turned to Serbia as the last vestige of authenticity in Europe, comparing Bosnian Serbs besieging Sarajevo to Native Americans besieging a camp of white colonizers.
- It would be interesting to apply this paradox of interpassivity to Schelling's notion of the highest freedom as the state in which activity and passivity, being-active and being-acted-upon, harmoniously overlap: human beings reach their acme when they turn their very subjectivity into the Predicate of an ever y yield, as it were, to the Other, "depersonalize" their most intense activity and perform it as if some other, higher Power is acting through them, using them as its medium—like the mystical experience of Love, or like artists who, in the highest frenzy of creativity, experience themselves as a medium through that some more substantial, impersonal Power expresses itself. (See Chapter 1 of Slavoj Zizek, The Indivisible Remainder [London: Verso, 1996].) This notion of the highest freedom designates the impossible point of perfect overlapping between passivity and activity in which the gap of inter-(activity or passivity) is abolished: when I am active, I no longer need another to be passive for me, in my place, since my very activity is already in itself the highest form of passivity; and vice versa, when, in an authentic mystical experience, I let myself go entirely, adopt the passive attitude of Gelassenheit, this passivity is in itself the highest form of activity, since in it, the big Other itself (God) acts through me.
- See Mladen Dolar's contribution to the conference cited in note 6.
- See Darian Leader, Why Do Women Write More Letters Than They Post? (London, Faber and Faber, 1966).
- When applied to our everyday ideological perceptions of the relationship between women and men, the term "cliché" is theoretically wrong. That is to say, when one denounces these perceptions as "clichés," this is as a rule said in such a way that it exempts us from a close analysis of what, precisely, these "clichés" are. Within the social space, everything is ultimately a "cliché" (i.e., a contingent symbolic formation not grounded in the immediate "nature of things"). "Clichés" are thus something to be taken extremely seriously, and the problem with the term "cliché" is that it is misleading insofar as one can always hear in front of it an imperceptible "mere" ("cliché" equals "a mere cliché").
- In the case of men, the presupposed Other's enjoyment is rather the source of obsessive anxiety: the ultimate goal of compulsive rituals is precisely to keep the Other mortified, to prevent that person from enjoying.
- When, in his scheme of four discourses, Lacan puts _ (subject) under S1 (the master-signifier), is not one possible way to read this substitution to put Woman under Man, i.e., to conceive of man as woman's metaphoric substitute, as her proxy? (The opposite substitution, _ under objet a, would be, of course, woman as man's substitute.)
- Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (New York, Little, Brown and Company, 1991), p. 132. (Dennett, of course, evokes this concept in a purely negative way, as a nonsensical contradictio in adjecto).
- For this notion of "Cartesian Theater," see Dennett, op. cit.
- The actuality of the subject supposed to believe in Stalinist “totalitarianism” is perhaps best exemplified by the well-known incident concerning the Great Soviet Encyclopedia that occurred in 1954, immediately after the fall of Beria. When Soviet subscribers received the volume of the encyclopedia containing the entries under the letter B, there was, of course, a double-page article on Beria, praising him as the great hero of the Soviet Union. After his fall and denunciation as a traitor and spy, all subscribers received a letter from the publishing house asking them to cut out and return the page on Beria; in exchange they were promptly sent a double-page entry (with photos) on the Bering Strait, so that, when they inserted it into the volume, its wholeness was reestablished: there was no blank to bear witness to the sudden rewriting of history. The mystery here is: for whom was this (semblance of) wholeness maintained, if all subscribers knew about the manipulation (since they had to perform it themselves)? The only answer is, of course: for the non-existing subject supposed to believe.
- See Michel de Certeau, “What We Do When We Believe”, in On Signs, ed. Marshall Blonsky (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 200. See also Chapter 5 of Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London, Verso, 1989).